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THE PRICE OF SUCCESS: MITIGATION AND
LITIGATION IN AIRPORT GROWTH
PAMELA B. STEIN
I. INTRODUCTION
TWENTY YEARS AGO one could travel the thirty-five
miles between the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth and
see large expanses of traditional Texas landscape: rolling
fields, groves of mesquite trees, and, arching above, the
state's famed big sky. Travelling the same route today
reveals a snapshot of the new Texas, with offices, hotels,
and shopping centers lining the roadway, and while the
sky above remains vast, it too is brimming with shining
symbols of sunbelt growth in the form of the hundreds of
airplanes arriving at and departing from the Dallas/Fort
Worth International Airport (DFW or the Airport).
This extensive ground-level development and the in-
creasingly crowded skies illustrate DFW's success in gen-
erating tremendous economic growth for north Texas.
Yet, this same success has brought about a classic con-
frontation. As the Airport seeks to expand, its neighbors
fear the increased noise and other negative impacts which
will inevitably accompany this growth.
What are the rights of homeowners and other citizens
who are affected by aircraft noise? What parties are re-
sponsible for deciding how to minimize the noise prob-
lem? When does aircraft noise cross the line from being a
minor inconvenience to begin such significant intrusion
that compensation must be paid to those affected? This
comment will explore the legal issues that arise when air-
port growth meets community or individual resistance
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due to increased airport generated noise pollution. Be-
cause DFW's recently announced expansion plans are
presently the focus of considerable debate regarding po-
tential noise level increases, DFW's situation illustrates
many aspects of this common controversy.
A. Expansion Plan
When DFW opened in 1974, it was the largest airport in
the United States, covering more than 18,000 acres.1 It
has since become the second busiest airport in the world
in terms of both total passengers and total aircraft opera-
tions.2 Although the original Airport Master Plan (Master
Plan) anticipated extensive growth, it was developed prior
to airline deregulation and the hub-and-spoking pattern
of major airline operations. As a result, the Master Plan
did not anticipate the concentrated increases in air traffic
that occurred in the past decade.4
Reacting to these operational innovations and other
changes over the twenty-year life of DFW, the Airport
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT SUMMARY, DALLAs/FoRT WORTH INTER-
NATIONAL AIRPORT at ii (1990).
2 Memorandum from the DFW Action Center, Dallas/Fort Worth International
Airport Fact Sheet 2 (1990). In 1989, DFW witnessed nearly 731,000 aircraft op-
erations and handled more than 48,500,000 passengers. Letter from Dana Ryan,
DFW Senior Planner (Nov. 7, 1991).
3 Questions & Answers, Airport Expansion Information, (DFW AIRPORT ACTION
CENTER, Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport) 1990, at 1. Under the hub-and-
spoke system, airlines schedule large numbers of flights to arrive at and depart
from their hub airports within a relatively short time span, facilitating passenger
connections to a wide variety of destinations. DFW serves as American Airline's
headquarters airport and also serves as a hub for Delta Air Lines. Id. at 1.
4 Donald V. Harper, Regulation of Aircraft Noise at Major Airports: Past, Present, &
Future, 17 TRANSP. L.J. 117, 119 (1988). Federal deregulation led to rapid growth
in the route systems of existing carriers and attracted new carriers into the market.
Flight operations of scheduled U.S. airlines increased from approximately nine
and one-half million take-offs and landings in 1976 to nearly 13 million operations
in 1986. Id. at 119-20. Total air traffic at DFW increased by 123 percent between
1978 and 1988. Questions & Answers, supra note 3, at 1. Forecasts of aviation de-
mand indicate that peak hour aircraft operations at DFW are projected to increase
from 177 in 1990 to 307 in 2010, with total annual operations increasing from
700,000 to 1,217,000 over the same 20 year period. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINIS-
TRATION, supra note 1, at iii.
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Board created a new Airport Development Plan (ADP).
Although the ADP calls for major expansion and redesign
of the present terminal, transit, and roadway systems, the
elements of the ADP which draw the greatest public inter-
est are two proposed new runways, referred to in the ADP
as 16/34E and 16/34W.5
Runway 16/34E was included in earlier airport plan-
ning, but was expected to be only 5000 feet long, limiting
its use to light corporate jets; runway 16/34W as not in-
cluded in the previous Master Plan.6 Surrounding munic-
ipalities did not anticipate their potential to generate
additional noise. Homes, schools, apartments and other
sensitive uses have been allowed to develop in the areas
now projected to experience significant noise increases
should these runways become operational.
B. Intermunicipal Issues
The cities of Dallas and Fort Worth acted in conjunc-
tion to create DFW, and its governing board includes rep-
resentatives from both cities.7 The Airport, however, is
not principally located in either city. It straddles the Dal-
las/Tarrant county line and is largely located in four
nearby municipalities: Irving, Coppell, Grapevine, and
Euless.8 These cities have clearly reaped economic bene-
fits from their proximity to the Airport. Many of DFW's
30,000 employees live in these neighboring cities, and
thousands of additional jobs and residents have been at-
tracted to the area by its convenient transportation
access.
9
- Questions &Answers, supra note 3, at 1. Runway 16/34E, proposed to be 8500
feet long, is intended to begin operating in 1992; the 9000 foot long runway 16/
34W is proposed for use in 1997. The two runways will both be used for major air
carrier operations and must be 5000 feet from other runways in order to accom-
modate simultaneous instrument-guided approaches. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN-
ISTRATION, supra note 1, at v.
Letter from Dana Ryan, supra note 2.
Memorandum from the DFW Action Center, supra note 2, at 1.
Only 1% of airport property is within Fort Worth city limits. Id.
9 Interview with Dana Ryan, DFW Senior Planner, at Dallas/Fort Worth Inter-
national Airport (Oct. 9, 1990).
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Yet, because these cities cannot directly control activi-
ties at DFW, their elected officials and residents remain
wary of the Airport's growth plans. I0 Although acknowl-
edging the economic boost provided by the airport, local
officials are also sensitive to the environmental and qual-
ity of life concerns of their residents. In addition, each
city has its own zoning ordinance and other development
controls, further complicating the airport's efforts to co-
operate with its neighbors on land use controls.
The conflict between the police power regulations of
these home rule cities and the airport's authority to man-
age its own growth under the Texas Municipal Airports
Act (TMAA)I l recently generated some litigation. In Dal-
las/Fort Worth Airport v. City of Irving,12 the court issued a
summary judgment declaring that neither the TMAA nor
the federal government preempted the cities from exer-
cising their own land use controls.' 3 Although the ruling
could be altered on appeal, for now, the cities have a
strong bargaining position in seeking noise mitigation
and other concessions to protect their residents.
II. PROPOSED MITIGATION PROGRAM
Recognizing the need to reassure property owners that
its current expansion program will not negatively affect
their investments, the Airport has already proposed a two-
tiered noise impact mitigation program. Under this pro-
posal, the Airport will purchase those homes that are in-
10 Testimony at public hearing, Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS),
Official Comment Program, (Sept. 22, 1990). For example, the mayor of Irving,
Texas, one of the cities bordering DFW, stated that the Draft EIS must have been
authored by "Rosy Scenario" because it underestimated the potential noise in-
creases and was overly optimistic regarding the economic benefits of further air-
port growth. Id. Other elected municipal officials and school district
representatives questioned the noise and tax base impacts of the expansion plan.
Id.
1 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 46d-1 (Vernon 1969).
12 No. 90-4298-I (Dallas County Dist. Ct., 162nd Judicial Dist. of Texas, Oct. 8,
1991) (order granting summary judgment).
'. For detailed discussion of federal preemption, see infra notes 21-61 and ac-
companying text.
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side a line conforming to the 70 Ldn noise contour 14 or
are within the clear zones of the new runways. 15 Persons
whose homes are within the 65-69 Ldn noise contours are
given the choice of either selling an avigation easement
for 25% of the unimpacted fair market value of their
home or participating in a sales guarantee program.' 6
The seller in the guarantee program also attaches an
avigation easement to the property at the time of the
sale.' 7 This easement includes a covenant of non-suit by
the property owner, designed to release and indemnify
the Airport Board and the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth
for liability resulting from noise, vibration, and other po-
tential problems caused by aircraft overflights."' Other
aspects of the mitigation program include structural mod-
ifications to improve the sound-proofing of multi-family
residences and public buildings, and operational meas-
ures such as runway preference systems and aircraft alti-
tude recommendations to minimize aircraft noise near
residential areas.'9
Funding for the expansion of DFW and the accompany-
ing mitigation program comes from a variety of sources.
Airline tenants at DFW bear the major portion of the cost
of gate and terminal expansions. Landing fees paid by
airlines utilizing the Airport will also partially finance new
runway construction, transportation system improve-
14 DALLAS/FORT WORTH INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, RELOCATION/MITIGATION
PROGRAM, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT I (Oct. 1989). Ldn represents a
weighted average of the day/night decibel sound level measured over a twenty-
four hour period. A ten decibel penalty is applied to noise events between 10
p.m. and 7 a.m. in computing this average. Id.
15 DALLAS/FORT WORTH INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, HOMEOWNERS' PROPOSED
MITIGATION PROGRAM FOR RUNWAYS 16/34 EAST AND WEST 1 (Aug. 1990).
16 Id. at 3-4. Appraisals are based on similar homes in unimpacted areas. Id.
Homeowners may list their homes with approved realtors at 90% of the appraised
value for a specified time period. If unsold, the property's price is lowered an
additional 5% for each of two additional periods. Id. If the property nevertheless
remains unsold, the Airport sells the property by sealed bid. Id.
17 Id. at 5.
18 Id. at 3.
- FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 1, at xvii.
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ments, and mitigation techniques. 20 The Aviation Trust
Fund, financed by an 8% passenger tax, is a potential
source of federal airport improvement grant funds, and
Congress also recently adopted legislation authorizing
airports to assess "passenger facility charges" on persons
departing from or connecting through airports.2 ' Since
DFW serves as a major hub for passenger connections as
well as a destination airport, projected revenues from this
new source run as high as $75,000,000 per year. 22 If
these estimates are correct, the Airport Board may be able
to avoid issuing its own revenue bonds to pay for the re-
mainder of the expansion program.2 3
The preliminary cost estimate for the mitigation pro-
gram alone is $250,000,000.24 Based on its assumption
that half of the eligible property owners will select the
sales guarantee program, the Airport Board expects to
recoup a substantial portion of this outlay through resale
of the properties it acquires. Thus, the Board estimates
the net cost of mitigation at $150,000,000.25
This estimate, however, includes only the airport's
planned expenditures under the mitigation program.
While it appears to be an extensive program, it is entirely
possible that persons not covered by the easement or
guaranteed sales proposals will also claim they are ad-
versely impacted by the expansion of DFW, and will seek
compensation for their alleged reduced property values
and other injuries. The next sections of this comment will
describe the additional land use impact liabilities airports
encounter as they grow, and will explore the current allo-
cation of responsibilities for dealing with these costs.
20 Ryan interview, supra note 9.
21 David Nather, DIFW Could Use Tax for Runways, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct.
31, 1990, at 25A.
22 Id.
23 Id.
2 Ryan interview, supra note 9.
2 1 Id.
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III. THE PLAYERS AND THEIR ROLES IN CONTROL OF
NOISE IMPACTS
A. Historical Basis for Federal Preemption
The practical demands of modern air travel long ago
led American courts to reject the common law doctrine
that one's ownership of land extended to the periphery of
the universe. 26 But if individuals no longer have the sole
right to determine what occurs in the airspace above their
property, who possesses this authority?
To a large extent, the federal government has declared
itself to be in control of the nation's airspace. Air travel is
considered to be a form of interstate commerce, subject
to federal regulation under the Constitution's Supremacy
Clause. 27 Pursuant to this authority, Congress has en-
acted a series of laws governing airport operations and
aircraft noise generation.28 Numerous court challenges to
26 U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1945). "The air is a public highway, as Con-
gress has declared. Were that not true, every transcontinental flight would sub-
ject the operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea."
Id. at 261.
27 The Constitution of the United States allocates to Congress the authority
"To regulate commerce ... among the several states". U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
28 A complete review of federal legislation in this area is beyond the scope of
this comment. Some of the more significant legislation, however, includes the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, giving the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
authority to insure aircraft safety and efficient utilization of the nation's airspace
and to protect persons and property on the ground. Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat.
806 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1988)). Congressional
amendment of the Act in 1968 required the FAA to establish aircraft noise stan-
dards designed to protect public health and welfare. Pub. L. No. 90-911, 82 Stat.
395 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1988)). Further amendment oc-
curred under the Noise Control Act of 1972 which established targets for the use
of new, quieter "Stage II" aircraft and a gradual phase out of noisier Stage I and
II planes. Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 1431 (1988)). Airport proprietors are encouraged to develop noise exposure
maps and abatement plans called for by the Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement
Act of 1979. Pub. L. No. 96-193, 94 Stat. 50 (codified as 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 2103(a)(l) (1988)). After submitting these plans to the federal government and
obtaining FAA approval, airport proprietors may modify aircraft operations to re-
duce the noise exposure of neighboring residents, Pub. L. No. 96-193, 94 Stat. 50
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. app. 2101 (1988)). Most recently, the Airport
Noise and Capacity Act calls for a new national policy on airport noise, emphasiz-
ing the need to coordinate local limitations on the use of Stage II and Stage III
520 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [57
these laws, however, attest to the continuing desire of lo-
cal governments and airport operators to retain some
control over airport noise problems.29
The key issue underlying these cases is the extent to
which federal legislation has preempted the regulatory
authority of state or municipal governments under the
Constitution's Supremacy Clause.30 Two cases arising
from noise controversies at Kennedy Airport in New York
were among the first decisions attempting to allocate gov-
ernment authority over noise generation.' In 1956, the
Village of Cedarhurst sought to enforce an ordinance
prohibiting flights at altitudes lower than 1000 feet. The
court found that the federal government's regulatory sys-
tem applied to flights at these lower altitudes, and the mu-
nicipal ordinance was therefore an invalid interference in
an area preempted by federal legislation. 2 Seeking to
aircraft. P.L. No. 101-508, § 9301, 104 Stat. 1388-378, 49 U.S.C. app. § 2151
(19-). For a more detailed discussion of the federal regulatory role in noise con-
trol see Leland C. Dolley & Douglas G. Carroll, Airport Noise Pollution Damages: The
Case for Local Liability, 15 URB. LAw. 621, 631-34 (1983) and Harper, supra note 4,
at 140-58.
29Municipalities have generally been unsuccessful in attempting to regulate air-
craft noise. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S.
624, 640 (1973); Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812,
816-17 (2d Cir. 1956); American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F.
Supp. 226, 236 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1017 (1969). However, in Faux-Burhans v. County Comm'rs, 674 F. Supp.
1172 (D. Md. 1987), aft'd, 859 F.2d 149, (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1042
(1989), the court upheld a county zoning ordinance imposing limits on the
number, type, and take-off distance of aircraft using a private airport. Id. at 1174.
For further discussion of these and related cases, see infra notes 31-70 and accom-
panying text; see also Lee L. Blackman & Roger P. Freeman, The Environmental Con-
sequences of Municipal Airports: A Subject of Federal Mandate?, 53 J. AIR L. & COM. 375,
381-89 (1987); Matin K. North, Comment, The Current State of the Law in Airport
Noise Pollution Control, 43 J. AIR L. & COM. 799, 806-07 (1977); Joshua A. Moss,
Comment, Aircraft Noise: Federal Pre-emption of Local Control, Concorde and other Recent
Cases, 43J. AIR L. & COM. 753, 781-87 (1977).
o U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1 cl.2 states: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land." For an in-depth discussion of the application of the Commerce
Clause to the regulation of airport noise, see Gale Schlesinger, Airport Noise: The
Proprietor's Dilemma, 16 TRANsp. LJ. 333, 336-42 (1988).
.,, Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d at 812; Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. at 226.
.12 Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d at 815. The village of Cedarhurst based its ordinance on
a federal regulation which established 1000 feet as the minimum safe altitude for
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avoid direct regulation of aircraft, and hence to avoid con-
flict with federal law, the town of Hempstead established
noise limits rather than flight regulations in its municipal
ordinance. But, the court held that Hempstead's ordi-
nance nevertheless conflicted with federal authority and
declared, "the aircraft and its noise are indivisible....
The ordinance does not forbid noise except by forbidding
flights .. .
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue
of federal preemption in the context of airport noise regu-
lation in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. 3' At
issue was a Burbank city ordinance placing curfews on jet
flights from the Hollywood-Burbank Airport between the
hours of 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. The court noted that the
FAA occasionally enforced curfews, but that such meas-
ures were generally opposed by the FAA unless the
agency itself managed the curfews in its role as supervisor
of navigable airspace. 5 The court also acknowledged the
lack of any express preemption in the 1972 Noise Control
Act.3 6 This lack of express preemption was not consid-
ered decisive, however, for preemption can also occur if
federal legislation is so pervasive that Congress leaves no
room for state regulation, or if federal interests are so
dominant that state regulation should be precluded. 7
aircraft flying over congested areas. The court, however, noted that the regula-
tion contained an express exception for take-offs and landings, the very activities
which caused lower flights over Cedarhurst. Thus, the court declared that the
federal regulatory system had preempted flights both below and above 1000 feet.
Id.
- Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. at 230. The effect of Hempstead's noise ordinance
(establishing a ground-level decibel limit for aircraft) was to close the airspace
over the town to aircraft operating at the low altitudes necessary for take-offs and
landings. The court found that this was essentially equivalent to the invalid Ce-
darhurst ordinance. Thus, the Hempstead ordinance was also declared to be a
violation of the federally granted right of travel through navigable airspace. Id.
34 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
- Id. at 628.
- Id. at 633. The 1972 Noise Control Act is codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1431.
37 Burbank, 411 U.S. at 633; see also Ronald D. Rotunda, Sheathing the Sword of
Federal Preemption, 5 CoNsT. COMMENTARY 311 (1988). Rotunda discusses recent
trends in preemption decisions and notes that the test for federal preemption can
be concisely summarized as follows:
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Relying on these two justifications for implied federal
preemption, the majority in Burbank held for the FAA.
The Court declared that "fractionalized" control of the
timing of flights by a variety of municipalities would se-
verely limit the FAA's ability to control air traffic, and that
the powers given by Congress to federal agencies should
not be diffused by allowing states or municipalities to par-
ticipate in the planning.3 But rather than definitively
ending the preemption debate, parts of the Burbank deci-
sion added fuel to the controversy.
B. The Proprietor Exemption
In footnote fourteen of the Burbank decision, the Court
discussed a letter that the Secretary of Transportation
submitted to Congress during the debate on the 1972
Noise Control Act.39 The letter expressed the Secretary's
view that the proposed Act would not affect the right of
state or local public agencies to issue regulations gov-
erning aircraft noise provided this was carried out in the
agency's role as proprietor of an airport.40 Airport owners
acting as proprietors could even deny access to their facil-
ities on the basis of aircraft noise as long as this was not
implemented in a discriminatory manner. 4' The Supreme
Court, therefore, emphasized that its holding in Burbank
was limited to the instance of a city acting within its police
power authority, and that it was not considering what lim-
[S]tate law can be preempted in either of two general ways. [First,]
If Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given field, any state law
falling within that field is preempted. [Second,] If Congress has not
entirely displaced state regulation over the matter in question, state
law is still preempted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal
law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both state and fed-
eral law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
Id. at 312 (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (internal
citations omitted)).
Burbank, 411 U.S. at 639-40.
Id. at 635-36. The Secretary of Transportation's letter is reprinted in S. REP.
No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Session 6 (1968).
4o Burbank, 411 U.S. at 635.
41 Id. at 636.
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its, if any, might apply to a municipal owner of an airport
acting as the facility's proprietor.42
The extent of this proprietor exemption has been the
subject of several court cases, often with conflicting re-
sults. 43 Some recent cases hold that proprietors still may
not directly regulate frequency of take-offs, nor establish
curfews, as such operational decisions are preempted by
federal occupation of the field. 4
Yet other courts reject total federal preemption.45 The
municipal operator of a California airport was allowed to
establish a curfew on particularly loud aircraft in National
Aviation v. City of Hayward.46 In another California case,
the court made a distinction between two noise standards.
Although the Single Event Noise Exposure Level
(SENEL) was preempted because it measured in-flight air-
craft noise, a more general Community Noise Equivalent
42 Id.
4 Harrison v. Schwartz, 572 A.2d 528 (Md. Ct. App. 1990) (finding preemption
based on congressional intent to occupy the field of aircraft navigation despite
lack of direct conflict between municipal and federal regulations). But see Arrow
Air v. Port Auth. of New York, 602 F. Supp. 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (allowing noise
level restrictions imposed by municipal proprietor as the restrictions did not im-
pede FAA purposes, were non-discriminatory, and thus did not violate Commerce
Clause); National Aviation v. City of Hayward, 418 F. Supp. 417, 421 (N.D. Cal.
1976) (holding that airport owners acting as proprietors can deny use of their
airports to aircraft on the basis of nondiscriminatory noise considerations (citing
Burbank, 411 U.S. at 635-36 n. 14)); Air Transport Ass'n v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58
(N.D. Cal. 1975) (holding that the proprietor's right to control the use of an air-
port is a necessary and well-established concomitant of the proprietor's responsi-
bility for the consequences of the airport's operation).
44 Harrison, 319 Md. at 369, 572 A.2d at 532. The court explained its view of
preemption as follows:
Once the field is occupied by the federal government, neither state
nor local government may enter it. And occupation of the field does
not mean every blade of grass within it must be subject to express
federal control; it means only that congressional intent demon-
strates that the area is subject to exclusive federal control, whether
potential or actual.
Id.
45 Arrow Air, 602 F. Supp. at 314; National Aviation, 418 F. Supp. at 417; Crotti,
389 F. Supp. at 58.
46 418 F. Supp. at 418 (upholding an 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. prohibition on take-offs
and landings of aircraft exceeding 75 dBA as valid exercise of proprietor control,
and rejecting attempts to substitute the judgment of the federal government for
state and local determinations).
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Level (CNEL) was permissible because it did not interfere
in an area regulated by the FAA.47 In other states, county
zoning restrictions limiting the use of a public airfield
have been upheld, 48 as have proprietor-established re-
strictions forbidding the use of noisier stage I aircraft.49
The recent Texas state district court ruling in Dallas!
Fort Worth International Airport Board v. City of Irving50
squarely addresses the issue of federal preemption of mu-
nicipal authority. Although acknowledging substantial
federal regulation of aircraft operations and exisiting air-
port facilities, the court distinguishes those issues from
the physical expansion of the borders of an airport.5
While the former might be preempted from local regula-
tion by the extent of federal involvement, the latter is con-
sidered to be a substantively different exercise of local
power:
Federal preemption would clearly apply were this a case of
a more "classic" nature, e.g., adjacent cities attempting to
regulate noise, establish a curfew, limit landing weight, or
otherwise regulate aircraft at an existing facility. The
criticial circumstance here, however, is not the day-to-day
operation of an existing airport but a planned $3.5 billion
expansion, including a territorial expansion.52
The court granted summary judgment to the cities sur-
rounding DFW airport who seek to control the airport's
expansion through exercise of their police power zoning
authority. Recognizing that Congress "has the power to
47 Crotti, 389 F. Supp. at 64 (responsibility for determining the permissible
noise level for aircraft using an airport remains with the proprietor of that
airport).
4" Faux-Burhans, 674 F. Supp. at 1174 (no federal statute or regulation explicitly
or implicitly preempts the regulation of the size, scope, and manner of operations
at a private airport operating under a special use permit).
49 Arrow Air, 602 F. Supp. at 319 (federal noise standard exemption on Arrow's
flights to San Juan did not preempt Port Authority from refusing to allow flights
by Arrow to other destinations in Puerto Rico where the aircraft assigned to those
routes failed to comply with the proprietor's noise standards).
o No. 90-4298-I Dallas County Dist Ct., 162ndJudicial Dist. of Texas, Oct. 8,
1991).
, Id. at 6-7.
. Id. at 5.
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pick up the club of federal preemption in this area,"5 3 the
court nonetheless concluded that neither existing regula-
tions nor case law indicated that it had done so.54
In fact, the attitude of the Supreme Court itself may
have undergone a change. Since the Burbank decision,
four of the five justices who formed the majority opinion
in that case have left the Court. The author of the dissent,
Justice Rehnquist, has become the Chief Justice, and Jus-
tice White, who joined the dissent, remains on the court.
In Burbank, Rehnquist noted that noise regulation has tra-
ditionally been an area of local rather than national con-
cern and that historic police powers should not be
superseded by federal regulation unless this is the "clear
and manifest" purpose of the Congress. 55 Justice Rehn-
quist argued that the logical division of authority over
noise allowed the federal government to study and regu-
late the mechanical and structural aspects of aircraft,
while local regulation controlled other aspects of airport
noise. 56 Although the majority of the Supreme Court did
not address the traditional Commerce Clause inquiry of
whether the restrictions were an unreasonable burden on
interstate commerce, Justice Rehnquist expressed his
opinion that the relatively few flights impacted by the Bur-
bank curfew did not constitute such a burden.
A number of recent Supreme Court decisions indicate
that other members of the Court are also increasingly
willing to accept local regulation in the commerce arena. 58
" Id.
4 Id. at 9.
5- Burbank, 411 U.S. at 653.
56 Id. at 643, 650.
-7 Id. at 650, 653.
5, Justice Rehnquist's discussion of the appropriate roles of federal and local
governments in Burbank seems to foreshadow recent Court debates relating to
commerce. In a number of cases, the Court balanced the state interest being pro-
tected against the effect a regulation has on interstate commerce. See, e.g., Ray-
mond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). But, in Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S.
662 (1981), Rehnquist, again dissenting, argued that balancing should be aban-
doned. He maintained that the proper inquiry was whether a state legislature had
acted rationally, and whether the benefits sought by a regulation were more than
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The current trend in Commerce Clause decisions appears
to favor acceptance of concurrent regulation, provided
state legislation does not preclude compliance with fed-
eral regulations.5 9 The Executive Branch has also demon-
strated an increasing reluctance to allow its regulations to
preempt state law. 60 Pursuant to an Executive Order is-
sued in 1987, executive departments and agencies must
prepare preemption impact statements when promulgat-
ing new regulations. 6' The Order emphasizes that federal
regulations may preempt state laws only when the federal
legislation contains an express preemption clause, when
evidence compels the conclusion that Congress intended
preemption, or when state regulation actually conflicts
with a federal statute.62
A key reason for federal reluctance to completely pre-
empt airport noise regulation is the liability which accom-
panies such control.63 The taking of a noise easement, for
example, requires compensation of the property owner.64
In Griggs v. Allegheny County,65 the Supreme Court rea-
soned that the proprietor, not the federal authorities,
makes the decision about where to locate an airport, and,
slight. If so, the regulation should be valid despite some interference with inter-
state commerce. Id. at 698-99.
'1 Rotunda, supra note 37, at 312. Rotunda notes that the Supreme Court re-
cently upheld a state law regulating attempted corporate takeovers despite exten-
sive federal regulation aimed at avoiding state protectionism in this field. See CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987). The Court stated, "[b]ecause it is
entirely possible to comply with both the [federal] Williams Act and the Indiana
Act, the state statute can only be preempted if it frustrates the purpose of the federal law."
Id. at 79 (emphasis added); see also Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) (upholding California restrictions considerably more
stringent than federal requirements on maturity of fruit even though the Califor-
nia regulations excluded certain Florida avocadoes from California markets).
-o Rotunda, supra note 37, at 311.
- Id. (citing Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (1987)).
62 Id.
61 Blackman & Freeman, supra note 29, at 386; see also Joseph Lesser, The Aircraft
Noise Problem: The Past Decade-Still Federal Power and, at Least for a While Longer,
Local Liability, 13 URB. LAw. 285 (1981).
- Causby, 328 U.S. at 261 (noting the United States conceded that if flights over
Causby's property rendered it uninhabitable, this would constitute a compensable
taking of private property under the fifth amendment of the Constitution).
,- 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
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hence, the proprietor should bear the costs of land and
easement acquisition.66
A municipal proprietor made an unsuccessful attempt
to secure indemnification from an airline operator for the
cost of an avigation easement in City of Los Angeles v. Japan
Lines Co. 67 The California Court of Appeals accepted the
Griggs68 reasoning, holding the municipality responsible
for the decision to build the airport in its present location.
The court then found no language in the air carrier's lease
requiring it to indemnify the city against a decision in
which the city itself took part.69 The court also noted the
lack of any California statutory authority for assessing
such costs against the airline.7 °
C. Summary of Noise Regulatory Authority
The result of several decades of federal and municipal
legislation and numerous court interpretations is a three-
tiered system of airport noise regulation:
1. Federal authority: Federal departments and agencies
- Id. at 89-90. In response to an argument that the airline or a federal agency
was the taker of the avigation easement, the Court stated:
[R]espondent, which was the promoter, owner, and lessor of the air-
port, is in these circumstances the one who took the easement in the
constitutional sense .... The Federal Government takes nothing; it
is the local authority which decides to build an airport vel non, and
where it is to be located. We see no difference between its responsi-
bility for the air easements necessary for operation of the airport and
its responsibility for the land on which the runways were built.
Id. at 89.
67 116 Cal. Rptr. 69 (Ct. App. 1974).
- 369 U.S. at 89-90.
6 Japan Air Lines, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 74. The lease agreements ofJapan Air Lines
(JAL) and the thirty other airline lessees at the Los Angeles airport who were
parties in this litigation did contain language indemnifying the City of Los Ange-
les for damages arising from the airlines' operations. But the court noted that the
leases also contained pledges by the city that JAL and its fellow airlines would
"peaceably have and enjoy the privileges of said Airport (LAX), its appurtenances
and facilities .... " Id. at 73. Further agreements and understandings between
the city and the airlines indicated that the city would be responsible for such prop-
erty rights as the city deemed necessary for operation of aircraft without unlawful
interference with the rights of neighboring property owners. Id. at 74.
70 Id. at 76-79.
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retain sole authority to regulate such technical areas as
aircraft development and airspace navigation.
2. State and municipal authority: Police power regulation
will be allowed provided it serves a valid public interest
and does not unduly burden interstate commerce. The
extent of the burden allowed has been determined on a
case by case basis, but there appears to be a trend to-
ward allowing greater local regulation.
3. Proprietor authority: The principal costs of airport
growth must be borne by those who operate these facil-
ities. Private or municipal owners of airports decide
when and where to build airports, and must acquire the
necessary land areas or easements. When the impact of
an airport extends beyond its immediate boundaries, it
is also the facility's proprietor who must deal with the
costs of these extra-territorial impacts.7'
Sections IV and V of this comment will explore proprie-
tor liability for the two most common impacts claimed, in-
verse condemnation and nuisance.
IV. INVERSE CONDEMNATION
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution
declares that private property shall not be taken for public
use without the payment of just compensation.7 2
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the impracti-
cability of extending private property rights to some infi-
nite point in the skies,73 the Court has also declared that
full enjoyment of one's property includes the right to be
free of airborne intrusions that substantially interfere with
71 See supra notes 31-70 and accompanying text for discussion of federal, munic-
ipal, and proprietor roles.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
71 Causby, 328 U.S. at 261. In an oft-quoted statement on the public right to air
travel, the Supreme Court declared:
The air is a public highway.... Were that not true, every transconti-
nental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits.
Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize such private claims
to the airspace would clog these highways, seriously interfere with
their control and development in the public interest, and transfer
into private ownership that to which only the public has a just claim.
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the use and enjoyment of property.74
A. What Impacts Are Compensable ?
The question that continually arises when property
owners abutting airports seek compensation for alleged
noise intrusions on their land is whether the damage suf-
fered is sufficient to amount to a taking of property. It has
long been accepted that individuals must bear minor costs
or endure small inconveniences when necessary to secure
a broad public benefit.75 Such a burden rises to the level
of a compensable taking only when the cost which a small
group is being asked to bear becomes disproportionate to
the benefit being secured. 76 Thus, property owners seek-
ing compensation for the impact of airport noise on their
property must show that they have suffered some harm
which goes well beyond that experienced by the general
public.
An analysis of the avigation easement cases reveals that
74 Id. at 264-65. The Court qualified its earlier characterization of the air as a
public highway, explaining that the property owner's rights in the superadjacent
airspace were to be treated similarly to rights in the land itself:
[I]t is obvious that if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the
land he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the
enveloping atmosphere.... The landowner owns at least as much
of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection
with the land .... [I]nvasions of it are in the same category as inva-
sions of the surface.
Id.
7. Id. at 266. ("The airplane is part of the modern environment of life, and the
inconveniences which it causes are normally not compensable under the Fifth
Amendment."); Scarlett v. City of Atlanta, 306 F. Supp. 1049, 1052 (N.D. Ga.
1969) ("In our modern jet age, certain inconveniences must be borne, unhappily,
as a price of progress .. " (citing Levell v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 734
(E.D.S.C. 1964)). The inconvenience or damage suffered must become extensive
or oppressive before a "taking" compensable under the Fifth Amendment will be
found. Scarlett, 306 F. Supp. at 1051 (citing United States v. 3276.21 Acres of
Land (Miramar), 222 F. Supp. 887, 891 (S.D. Cal. 1963)).
76 A complete discussion of the takings issue is beyond the scope of this com-
ment. A classic case in this area, however, is Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922), in which the Supreme Court stated "[tihe general rule at least is,
that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far,
it will be considered a taking." Id. at 417. In the aircraft context, the "regulation"
which creates grounds for a taking could be the establishment of an airport's gen-
eral location or the more detailed decisions regarding flight paths and altitudes.
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most courts apply either a physical invasion test, a dimi-
nution in value test, or a combination of the two. In the
earliest of these cases, United States v. Causby,77 govern-
ment military aircraft made direct overflights at altitudes
barely above the treetops of respondents' farm. The air-
craft noise was so great that the poultry on the farm would
fly into the walls in fright, killing themselves. The Caus-
bys were forced to give up the commercial chicken busi-
ness, and suffered property losses estimated at $2,000.78
The Court noted that these damages were "the product
of a direct invasion of the respondents' domain", and fur-
ther stated that "so long as the damage [was] substantial,"
it was the "character of the invasion" that determined
whether or not a taking had occurred. 79 The "invasion"
in Causby was repeated direct overflights, and this re-
quirement of a physical overflight was frequently applied
in the early avigation easement cases. It remains signifi-
cant in the states whose constitutions, like the federal con-
stitution, allow compensation only where there has been a
taking of property.8 °
One of the earliest cases to allow a broader approach to
the compensation issue was Thornburg v. Port of Portland.8 t
The plaintiffs sought compensation for inverse condem-
nation 82 of their property, which was located directly
77 328 U.S. at 256.
78 Id. at 259, 267.
79 Id.
80 See, e.g., Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 90 (1962) (direct over-
flights occurring "very, very close" to a residence held to be a compensable tak-
ing); Town of East Haven v. Eastern Airlines, 331 F. Supp. 16, 31-33 (D. Conn.
1971) (strictly interpreting Causby, 328 U.S. 256, and Griggs, 369 U.S. 84, as re-
quiring the line of flight to be directly above a plaintiff's land in order to consti-
tute a taking, and denying compensation to persons claiming damage from noise,
soot and fumes by aircraft taxiing or idling nearby).
- 376 P.2d 100 (Or. 1962) (en banc).
82 Inverse condemnation describes the cause of action of a property owner
seeking compensation from the government for a taking of his property when the
government has not used eminent domain to acquire the property, but the land
has been negatively impacted by a government activity. Id. at 105. The Port of
Portland was owner and operator of the Portland International Airport. It was a
governmental agency with power of eminent domain, which it used to acquire
land in the airport vicinity. Id. at 101.
AIRPORT GROWTH
under the path of aircraft using a runway approximately
six thousand feet from their land and roughly one thou-
sand feet to one side of the glide path of aircraft using a
runway just 1500 feet from their property. The plaintiffs
claimed that the noise of aircraft using these two runways
created a continuing nuisance, and as such amounted to a
taking of their property. The Port based its defense on
the lack of any trespass, claiming that the aircraft passing
directly over the plaintiffs' land were too high to cause
compensable interference, and that no taking resulted
from the planes passing at lower altitudes but to the side
of the property. 3
The trial court followed a traditional approach, essen-
tially creating an imaginary box of airspace extending five
hundred feet above the plaintiff's land. Since no planes
passed directly through this box, the trial court found no
taking had occurred. 4
The Oregon Supreme Court correctly assessed the sig-
nificance of the issue before it, recognizing that it would
be creating a new property interest if it determined that a
government agency could be required to pay landowners
for the inconvenience of noise coming from beyond the
traditional boundaries of their property."5 After a careful
review the of the laws of nuisance and inverse condemna-
tion, the court succinctly stated its conclusion that "[t]he
real question was not one of perpendicular extension of
surface boundaries into the airspace, but a question of
reasonableness based on nuisance theories. 8 6 The court
8., Id. at 101-02.
84 Id. at 102. The Civil Aviation Administration was authorized to establish
minimum safe flight altitudes, with these establishing the lower limits of federally-
regulated navigable airspace. In the case of the Thornburg property, this altitude
was 500 feet. Id. at 111.
I d. at 102.
Im' d. at 107. The court explained its logic:
If we accept, as we must upon established principles of the law of
servitude, the validity of the propositions that a noise can be a nui-
sance; that a nuisance can give rise to an easement; and that a noise
coming straight down from one's land can ripen into a taking if it is a
persistent enough and aggravated enough, then logically the same
kind and degree of interference with the use and enjoyment of one's
1991]
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recognized that to one ousted from enjoyment of his land,
"it is to him an academic matter that the planes which
have ousted him did not fly below 500 feet."8 7
Having found that the plaintiffs did possess a possible
cause of action, the court remanded the claim for jury
trial. The jury was charged with determining if the activi-
ties of the government so unreasonably and substantially
interfered with the use of plaintiffs' property that they
were deprived of the practical enjoyment of their land. If
the jury so found, it was to translate the loss in enjoyment
into a reduction in the land's market value.88
Thornburg thus became the first case to hold that a com-
pensable trespassory taking could involve noise interfer-
ence from beside a property rather than only directly above
it. A number of state courts have since found the Thorn-
burg decision persuasive. 89 In Martin v. Port of Seattle,90 the
Supreme Court of Washington rejected an attempt to
classify plaintiff property owners on the basis of whether
or not their property was subject to direct overflights. 9'
The court declared its unwillingness to accept differing
levels of compensation that depended upon "anything as
land can also be a taking even though the noise vector may come
from some direction other than the perpendicular.
Id. at 106.
81 Thornburg, 376 P.2d at 109.
8 Id. at 110,
89 Martin v. Port of Seattle, 391 P.2d 540, 545 (Wash. 1964) (en banc) (declin-
ing to distinguish between a "taking" or "damaging" of property interests of
nearly 200 plaintiffs all of whom alleged harm caused by noise and vibration
rather than by physical invasion of property); see also City of Jacksonville v. Schu-
mann, 167 So.2d 95, 97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), aff'd, 199 So.2d 727 (Fla.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 981 (1968) (allowing compensation of numerous prop-
erty owners whose property was not subject to direct overflights but was subject
to vibrations from acceleration of airplane engines on nearby taxiways and warm-
up pad); Johnson v. City of Greenville, 435 S.W.2d 476, 479-80 (Tenn. 1968)
(physical invasion of property was not required to justify compensation of the
plaintiff whose house pre-dated construction of an airport runway located within
300 feet of the residence).
391 P.2d at 540.
1, Id. at 542, n.2. The property owners were divided into three groups, with
category A referring to those subject to direct overflights, category B referring to
those for whom overflights were disputed, and category C referring to those not
experiencing direct overflights. Id.
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irrelevant as whether the wing tip of the aircraft passes
through some fraction of an inch of the airspace directly
above the plaintiff's land".92
Also significant in Martin was the language of the Wash-
ington State Constitution. Unlike the federal Constitu-
tion, which refers to compensation only for a "taking" of
property without compensation,93 the court emphasized
that the Washington Constitution also provides compen-
sation for a "damaging" of property.94
The California Court of Appeals pointed to a similar
provision in its state constitution when awarding compen-
sation for persons whose property values were affected by
aircraft noise. In Aaron v. City of Los Angeles,95 a group of
residents living near Los Angeles International Airport
presented evidence from professional appraisers that
their property values had declined due to jet noise. 96 The
California court did not, however, rely solely on its state
constitution provisions prohibiting "damaging" of prop-
erty when it allowed compensation to plaintiffs not lo-
cated within a direct flight path of the Los Angeles
airport.9 7 Rather, the court emphasized the availability of
technological means of measuring aircraft noise effects.
Since the annoyance effect could be measured and maps
could then be drawn to indicate the boundaries of areas
subject to differing noise levels, the court concluded that
92 Id. at 545.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Martin, 391 P.2d at 546. Injustifying its holding, the court explained that the
ninth amendment of the Washington State Constitution specifically provides for
payment of compensation for a "damaging" as well as the more standard "tak-
ing". Id. at 543, 546. The court looked to the legislative intent behind this addi-
tion, noting:
The specific purpose of the addition of language beyond that of the
United States Constitution is to avoid the distinctions attached to
the word "taking" appropriate to a bygone era. It is unnecessary to
become embroiled in the technical differences between a taking and
a damaging in order to accord the broader conceptual scope in-
tended by the additional language.
Id. at 546.
., 115 Cal. Rptr. 162, 172 (Ct. App. 1974).
- Id. at 165.
97 Id. at 171-72.
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these contours provided a more accurate description of
areas harmed than would the presence of a "wing tip" in a
plaintiff's airspace.98 The court declared that interference
in use and enjoyment of the property, coupled with a de-
cline in its market value, were sufficient to justify compen-
sation. No actual "trespass" into airspace was required. 99
Not all courts have recognized such a broad interpreta-
tion of compensable inverse condemnation. When a fed-
eral facility or activity is involved, courts have limited
damages to persons harmed by actual overflights. 00 Typ-
ically, such cases point to the fifth amendment of the Con-
stitution and its limitation of compensation to instances
where property is taken. In Batten v. United States,' 0' for
example, residents subjected to clouds of black smoke
and loud noise from a nearby Air Force aircraft warm-up
area were denied compensation due to the absence of
physical trespass by the airplanes. The court distin-
guished between a compensable taking and mere "conse-
quential damages," noting that even when government
action impairs use of property, absent a direct encroach-
ment, the fifth amendment does not require compensa-
tion. 0 2 Similarly, in Avery v. United States, l0 3 the United
States Court of Claims held that sound and shock waves
98 Id. ("The plaintiffs are not seeking recovery for a technical trespass, but for a
combination of circumstances engendered by the nearby flights which interfere
with the use and enjoyment of their land." (quoting Martin, 391 P.2d at 545)).
The California Court of Appeals also quoted with approval from the California
trial court's opinion:
Since the noise from jet aircraft is capable of acceptable and recog-
nized measurement in terms of its annoyance effect, no reasonable
basis exists for making a legal difference between the effects caused
by flyby aircraft and the same effects caused by flyover aircraft ....
The development of the NEF [noise exposure forecast] contour ar-
eas provides a good means of drawing a reasonable line between
those landowners who may establish a cause of action for inverse
condemnation and those who may not.
Id. at 485, n.8, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
99 Aaron, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
oo Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
955 (1963).
1 Id.
102 Id. at 583.
., Avery v. United States, 330 F.2d 640 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (denying that sound and
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generated by government aircraft created injury which
was only "incidental" and "unavoidably attendant" to the
permissible use of the airways. 0 4 Hence, the court found
no physical taking, and followed the Batten rule in denying
compensation to plaintiff property owners. 10 5
Emphasizing that the compensable damage in Causby '0 6
and Griggs i0 7 resulted from frequent, low overflights, the
court in Bennett v. United States denied compensation to a
group of Oklahoma City property owners. 0 8 The federal
sonic boom test program, alleged to cause the harm com-
plained of in Bennett, operated at relatively high altitudes.
The court therefore held the test program's effects were
not sufficiently direct, frequent or low to constitute a
physical taking, and the affected property owners thus
failed to qualify for federal government compensation.1 0 9
Some states continue to follow these narrow federal
guidelines, pointing to state constitutions which limit
compensation to instances of takings, or relying on state
statutes protecting the public use of airspace." 0 New
Hampshire, for example, relied on such a constitutional
provision to deny compensation to persons alleging harm
due to aircraft noise but not experiencing direct over-
flights in Ferguson v. Keene.I l I The state's highest court,
however, has since abandoned the physical invasion test.
In Sundell v. Town of New London," 12 the Supreme Court of
shock waves generated by aircraft created a physical invasion sufficient to merit
compensation for a taking of property).
1o Id. at 643.
105 Id. at 645.
1- 369 U.S. at 84.
107 328 U.S. at 256.
,0s 266 F. Supp. 627 (W.D. Okla. 1965) (action brought by Oklahoma City area
residents seeking compensation for alleged harm caused by federally conducted
test of sonic booms under differing atmospheric conditions).
-0 Id. at 629-30.
110 Ferguson v. Keene, 238 A.2d 1 (N.H. 1968), overruled by Sundell v. Town of
New London, 409 A.2d. 1315 (1979) (state constitution limits compensation to
instances where property is taken); Cheyenne Airport Board v. Rogers, 707 P.2d
717 (Wyo. 1985) (statute gives public right of passage through airspace).
- 238 A.2d at 1.
112 409 A.2d at 1319.
1991] 535
536 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [57
New Hampshire declared that the right to recover for in-
verse condemnation "cannot be made to depend upon
the means by which the property is taken."' " 3
The Sundell court explained that its traditional reliance
on a physical invasion by tangible things now yielded to a
new concern with the effects on rights of individuals." 4
The foul odors resulting from fish kills and algae blooms
caused by the town's sewage treatment plant in Sundell
''can surely interfere with an owner's use of his land as
much as an invasion by a more solid substance."'" 5 To
the extent that this holding conflicted with Ferguson, the
court declared Ferguson to be overruled." 6
Should other jurisdictions decide to follow the Oregon,
Washington, and New Hampshire examples, the physical
invasion test may become a thing of the past. In its place,
courts may apply a more individualized test based on the
noise levels and other negative effects of aircraft opera-
tions actually experienced on a property, regardless of its
locations inside or outside a direct overflight path.
B. Federal Statutory Attempts to Limit Liability
The federal government attempted to clarify liability is-
sues with passage of the Aviation Safety and Noise Abate-
ment Control Act of 1979." 7 Under this legislation,
airport operators are encouraged to prepare and submit
noise exposure maps to the Secretary of Transporta-
tion." 8 After a map is printed in the local newspaper, all
persons subsequently purchasing property in the area sur-
rounding an airport are considered to have notice of the
noise level, and are barred from recovering damages for
Id.
Id. at 1318.
its Id. at 1319.
1 1oId.
117 Pub. L. No. 96-193, 96 Stat. 696 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 2103
(1988)).




An important exception to the act, however, specifically
states that this limitation will not apply if the property
owner can show that the noise complained of results from
a significant change in the type or frequency of aircraft
operations or in the airport layout. °2 0 Thus, when an air-
port such as DFW undertakes construction of new run-
ways or other improvements which will increase its
capacity, nearby property owners may bring actions
against the airport for increased noise impacts.
The Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990121 includes
the most recent federal attempt to walk the tightrope be-
tween retaining federal control over airport operations
and avoiding federal liability for property takings result-
ing from airport noise. The act calls for the creation of a
national noise policy to coordinate the independent ac-
tions of airport proprietors. Special emphasis is placed
on regulations that differentiate between Stage II and
Stage III aircraft. 22 An airport proprietor or municipality
seeking to restrict operations of Stage II aircraft must pre-
pare and publicize a cost/benefit analysis of the impact of
these new rules, including a description of any alternative
119 Id. § 2107.
120 Id. The statute provides, in pertinent part:
No person who acquires property... after February 18, 1980 in an
area surrounding an airport with respect to which a noise exposure
map has been submitted . . . shall be entitled to recover damages
with respect to the noise attributable to such airport if such person
had actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of such noise
exposure map unless ... such person can show that-
(1) a significant change in the type or frequency of aircraft opera-
tions at the airport; or
(2) a significant change in the airport layout; or
(3) a significant change in the flight patterns; or
(4) A significant increase in nighttime operations; occurred after the
date of the acquisition of such property or interest therein and
that the damages for which recovery ins sought have resulted
from any such change or increase.
Id. The statute further states that constructive knowledge shall be imputed if the
noise exposure has been published in a local general circulation newspaper at
least three times or a copy of the map was given to the purchaser. Id.
121 P.L. No. 101-508 § 9301, 104 Stat. 1388-378, 49 U.S.C. app. § 2151 (-).
22 Id. § 9304.
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noise control techniques considered. New controls on
Stage III aircraft operations must either be approved by
proprietors and aircraft operators or by the Secretary of
Transportation. Failure to obtain an approval may result
in loss of eligibility to impose a passenger facility fee or to
obtain federal airport improvement plan funds.12 3
The 1990 act states that the federal government will be
liable for noise-related damages "only to the extent that a
taking has occurred as a direct result of such disap-
proval."' 12 4 Stage III aircraft are the least-noisy class of
planes presently in commercial operation. Shifting from
Stage II to Stage III aircraft may allow more flights and
longer hours of operation without increasing present cu-
mulative noise levels. Federal disapproval of a Stage III
limit may therefore prevent a hoped-for reduction in
noise, but is not likely to cause an increase in noise gener-
ation sufficient to constitute a taking of property.
C. Application to DFW
The Texas Constitution follows the broader pattern of
the Washington and California Constitutions. Adequate
compensation is required in Texas if property is "taken,
damaged, or destroyed for or applied to public use." 125
Texas case law does not require any appropriation or in-
trusion upon the land itself to find a damaging, but rather
defines compensable damage as "an injury peculiar to cer-
tain property not suffered in common with other property
in the community."' 126 Thus, although the leading Texas
case dealing with compensation for airplane noise in-
123 Id.
,2 Id. § 9306.
"2 TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 17.
126 Fort Worth Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. City of Ft. Worth, 158 S.W. 164, 169
(Tex. 1913) (the Constitution's use of the broad term "damaged" covers all in-
stances of injury to rights or property caused by public works or purposes); Tar-
rant County Water Control & Improvement Dist. v. Reid, 203 S.W.2d 290 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947) (injury to land not occupied by the action creates a cause of ac-
tion for damage to property); Nueces County Drainage & Conservation Dist. v.
Bevly, 519 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (homeowner successfully sued city
for injury to land not physically invaded or appropriated).
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volved a direct overflight, Texas courts apparently need
not limit themselves to such trespassory grounds for
awarding compensation.'27
Rather than limiting compensation solely to those in
the flight path, the DFW proposal will offer compensation
to all homeowners within the 65 Ldn contour. 2a This ap-
proach is apparently related to the federal noise contour
map program and follows the logic, applied in Aaron, that
the overflight distinction should be abandoned when
"modern day noise measurement techniques provide
more sophisticated means of drawing the dividing line be-
tween compensability and noncompensability."'' 21 It also
reflects the probability that Texas courts applying the
state's Constitution would follow the logic of Aaron, Mar-
tin, and Sundell, to the effect that no direct overflight is
required for a compensable "damaging" of property.13 0
D. Defenses to Inverse Condemnation Claims
The use of noise contour boundaries in a mitigation
program should help airports show that they are attempt-
ing to deal with all property owners on the basis of actual
noise impacts. Will this contour-based distinction with-
stand challenges by those just outside its boundaries?
The answer may depend on the ability of those not pres-
ently defined as eligible for compensation to prove an ac-
tual decline in the value of their property due to the
operation of the new runways.
Courts have frequently required that those claiming in-
verse condemnation must demonstrate a significant loss
in the value of their property in order to be awarded dam-
ages. 13  In two New York cases, Kupster Realty Corp. v.
"21 City of Houston v. McFadden, 420 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (inci-
dental or consequential property value decrease caused by low overflights of jet
aircraft).
128 See supra note 15 and accompanying text for discussion of Homeowners' Pro-
posed Mitigation Program.
121. Aaron, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
13o Id. at 171; Martin, 391 P.2d at 540; Sundell, 409 A.2d at 1315.
13 E.g., Scarlett v. City of Atlanta, 306 F. Supp. 1049, 1051-52 (N.D. Ga. 1969)
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State,13 2 and 3775 Gennessee Street v. State,' 33 the plaintiffs
were not compensated for projected future damages.
Rather, the avigation easements already acquired by the
airports were limited to allowing the amount of noise
presently generated, and plaintiffs were advised that they
would have to show a decline in the value of their prop-
erty to collect damages for any future harm.13 4
This emphasis on market value can lead to a costly and
confusing battle of expert witnesses, as each side presents
an array of real estate appraisals and market studies to
demonstrate the impact of aircraft noise on property val-
ues. 3 5  Florida courts have held that property owners
must make a detailed showing of "substantial damage." 13 6
In a rapidly growing area such as Florida, where land val-
ues are rising in response to population increases, this can
be difficult test as property values may rise despite an un-
acceptable level of airport noise. Property owners claim-
ing that they have suffered a more modest increase in
value than they would have experienced in the absence of
intrusive noise have been denied compensation for their
(the interference with plaintiff's property "must be substantial, not merely conse-
quential .... The inconvenience or damage suffered must become extensive or
oppressive before a 'taking' compensable under the Fifth Amendment will be
found.").
132 404 N.Y.S.2d 225, 235 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (damages paid to acquire aviation ease-
ment must be "reasonably probable and reasonably ascertainable.").
,- 415 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (denying damages for projected future in-
creases in noise because no correlation to decreased property value was shown).
34 Kupster, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 236; 3775 Genessee St., 415 N.Y.S.2d at 586.
1. See Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 317 N.W.2d 352 (Minn.
1982). Seven different experts on property values testified in this trial, three for
the petitioner property owners and four for the respondent Commission. Two of
those testifying for respondent had used very sophisticated computer regression
analysis and market research techniques on a data base of the 1,819 sales re-
corded in the city assessor's office over the past eight years. Although petitioner's
experts found a property value reduction of 5-15%, thejury felt the larger studies
by respondent were more convincing. These studies showed aircraft noise had
little or no effect on market values in the affected neighborhood. Id. at 355-57.
.16 See Fields v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 512 So.2d 961, 965 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1987) (denying compensation to property owner because Florida law
requires showing of "substantial damage to be entitled to inverse condemnation
in airport cases"); Adams v. County of Dade, 335 So.2d 594 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976), cert. denied, 344 So.2d 323 (Fla. 1977) (no diminution in property value
because of rising values in area as a whole, so no inverse condemnation).
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"decreased increase." 3 7
The unstable real estate market in the vicinity of DFW
during the past ten years will create a challenge to the ap-
praisal industry and to the judges and juries asked to in-
terpret their findings. Because of the job growth
generated by DFW and related development in the early
1980's, property values in the airport vicinity were high.
The current real estate slow-down in Texas has caused
housing values to drop significantly in most communities.
Although home sales prices increased in the area in 1989
and early 1990, the national recession and local economic
uncertainty caused home sales prices to drop during the
last three quarterly reporting periods of 1990.138 Should
prices rise, persons seeking to show a negative impact
from airport noise may be in the "decreased increase"
category, which is not compensable in Florida. If prices
remain flat or decline, it may actually be easier for home-
owners to show they are harmed by an "increased de-
crease" over the declines experienced by owners of
similar, non-noise-impacted homes.
When neither a lack of direct overflight nor a failure to
show a diminished property value are available as de-
fenses, some airports have successfully fended off inverse
condemnation claims because of the timing of the claims.
Property owners may seek compensation for anticipated
declines in property values due to widespread publicity
about airport expansion plans and the resulting fear of in-
creased noise in adjacent neighborhoods. But such claims
have been disallowed as premature where the property
owners have not yet been damaged but are attempting to
obtain compensation for future airport development and
the anticipated noise increases.1 3 9
13 Fields, 512 So.2d at 965 ("decreased increase" of 1% of property value is
neither a continuing invasion of property nor sufficient deprivation of beneficial
use to constitute inverse condemnation).
" Steve Brown, Home Sales Drop Shaply, Dallas Morning News, Nov. 6, 1990, at
I D.; Steve Brown, Home Sales Plunge 7.375 for Quarter, Dallas Morning News, Feb.
14, 1991, at ID.
-9 3775 Gennessee Street, 415 N.Y.S. at 586 (denying compensation to property
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Moreover, several courts have held for the airport pro-
prietor when the claimant has waited too long to voice his
complaint, and has violated the state's statute of limita-
tions. 40 Generally, the point at which the substantial de-
crease in property value occurs marks the date of a
"taking" for purposes of applying the statute of limita-
tions.' 4 ' Property owners and airport authorities need to
carefully monitor area market values in the early months
of operation of new airport facilities to determine if a de-
monstrable drop in property values can be linked to the
increased noise. If such a decrease occurs, it will become
the starting point for the running of the statute of
limitations.
An additional time-related hurdle faced by property
owners is the ability of an airport to acquire a prescriptive
easement under the common law doctrine of adverse pos-
session. An avigation easement is acquired by prescrip-
tion if the noise, fumes, and other intrusions caused by
aircraft occupy a property owner's airspace without objec-
tion for such time that, under state statutes, ownership of
airspace is transferred to the airport. 4 2 The owner of the
property underneath the prescripted airspace is then un-
able to assert any claims based on a taking of this airspace.
E. Scope of the Easement Acquired
The exact extent of an avigation easement acquired
either through an airport's voluntary purchase or as re-
quired by court action has not been widely addressed. In
the model easement form provided by DFW, the property
owner who failed to establish that a projected increase in air traffic would decline
in property value).
140 Boardman v. United States, 376 F.2d 895 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (six-year statute of
limitations barred action by plaintiff in 1963 for aircraft overflights from airport in
operation since 1955).
,4, Id. at 899.
142 See Institoris v. City of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 418, 425 (Ct. App. 1989)
(prescriptive avigation easement acquired over plaintiff's property bars nuisance
action for airport noise); Christie v. Miller, 719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986)
(acquisition of avigation easement by prescription is not defeated because aircraft
did not continuously land and take off).
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owner grants a right of way for all aircraft together with
the right to cause "such noise, vibration, fumes, dust, fuel,
and lubricant particles, and all other effects that may be
caused" by aircraft using DFW. 143 The only exception to
the easement is that owners or operators of aircraft may
still be held liable for personal injuries or property dam-
age caused by aircraft or objects from aircraft actually fall-
ing from the sky. This easement is to run with the land,
binding all successors, until such time as Dallas/Fort
Worth Regional Airport is abandoned and no longer used
for public airport purposes.' 44
Such broad language may not survive court scrutiny. In
Avery v. United States,' 45 the court held that the use of an
existing easement by new and heavier aircraft constituted
an additional taking. 46 Similarly, the New York courts in
Kupster and 3775 Genessee Street both limited the scope of
the easements acquired. 147 To do otherwise, the courts
noted, would be to allow unlimited use of the easement by
virtually any type of aircraft. This wide-open interpreta-
tion would essentially destroy the market value of the
property. The taking would then have to be based on the
value of the entire property, not just an avigation
easement. 1
48
,4. Model Avigation Easement Form, DFW Airport staff, October, 1990.
144 Id.
145 330 F.2d 640, (Ct. Cl. 1964) (limiting a "perpetual easement" already held
by the federal government to the type of aircraft present when the easement was
acquired, and holding that a new taking had occurred due to introduction of new
aircraft, increased operations, and resulting decreased residential land values in
the area subject to direct overflights.)
143 Id. at 643.
147 Kupster, 404 N.Y.S. 2d at 235; 3775 Genessee Street, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
148 In Kupster, the court limited the easement to damages which would be "rea-
sonably probable and reasonably ascertainable." Kupster, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
The court chose to use 1979 air traffic projections as the limit of aircraft opera-
tions that would be allowed under the easement acquired. Id. In 3775 Genessee
Street, the court echoed this reasoning and stated:
To the extent that future airport operations result in an appreciable
increase in the frequency of overflights, or in the intensity of the
noise produced, and to the further extent that there is a demonstra-
ble effect on market value, additional servitude may be imposed ...
which will give rise to a new claim for the appropriation of a further
avigation easement.
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V. NUISANCE
Nuisance actions are the second major category of
claims available to persons alleging harm due to airport
noise. A nuisance is an unprivileged interference with a
personal or property right. 149 Unlike the narrow interpre-
tation of inverse condemnation used in some states, re-
quiring a physical invasion of property rights,' 0 no actual
trespass is required to find a nuisance.'15  Since very loud
noise can readily be considered an interference with one's
enjoyment of property or with one's emotional peace and
well-being, the doctrine of nuisance clearly applies in the
airport noise context. Yet the complex nature of this
cause of action presents numerous challenges to those
seeking damages based on nuisance.
A. Background
Nuisance is a common law remedy, and thus is largely a
creature of state court decisions.' 52 Accordingly, its utility
will vary in different jurisdictions. A full review of these
nuances is beyond the scope of this comment. Instead,
this comment will focus on the major cases in which plain-
tiffs brought nuisance actions in pursuit of a remedy for
airport noise.
Parties must overcome two initial hurdles in order to
bring a nuisance claim against an airport. These hurdles
are sovereign immunity and preemption. Since many air-
port proprietors are arms of municipal, federal or state
governments, the proprietor may claim governmental im-
munity from such actions, or at least require that claims
comply with the Federal Tort Claims Act or one of its
state counterparts.15 3
415 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
149 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 86, at
617 (5th ed. 1984); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821A (1977).
- See supra notes 71-116 and accompanying text for discussion of inverse
condemnation.
15, RESTATEMENT, supra note 149 § 821D.
1 I, d. § 821A.
I," Vincent J. Rossi, Jr., Note, Inverse Condemnation and Nuisance: Alternative Reme-
AIRPORT GROWTH
Related to immunity is the concept of legitimized nui-
sance, which rests on the theory that no nuisance can be
claimed if the act complained of is the result of a legisla-
tive directive.' 54  The defendant in Greater Westchester
Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles' 55 advanced this the-
ory. Plaintiffs, owners and occupants of homes near the
Los Angeles Airport (LAX), sued the city for inverse con-
demnation and nuisance created by the noise, fumes, and
vibrations emanating from aircraft at LAX. 56 In its de-
fense, the city argued that the state's civil code created a
legislative sanction for the airport's operation. 57
The Supreme Court of California rejected the city's
legitimization argument. The court first pointed to the
narrow construction it had previously given to the appli-
cable code provision:
A statutory sanction cannot be pleaded in justification of
acts which by the general rules of law constitute a nui-
sance, unless the acts complained of are authorized by the
express terms... or by the plainest and most necessary
dies for Airport Noise, 24 SYRACUSE L. REv. 793, 804 (1973); see also Flippen v. City of
Beaumont, 525 S.W.2d 285, 286-87 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (operation of munici-
pal airport is a governmental function giving sovereign immunity from the per-
sonal injury tort claim made by plaintiff).
'- Rossi, supra note 153 at 807; see also KEETON et al, supra note 149, at 632-33.
Professor Keeton's description of legitimation explains that when a legislative
body authorizes a specific use, such as an airport, that act would seem to be a
declaration that it is in the public interest for that activity to be conducted at that
particular place. As long as reasonable care is exercised to minimize the extent of
the interference with others, the activity would probably not be enjoinable as a
private nuisance. If, however, market values of property in the vicinity were sub-
stantially depreciated, a court could conclude this was an unreasonable and com-
pensable interference. See, e.g., Atkinson v. City of Dallas, 353 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 939 (1962) (dealing with an alleged nuisance
created by noise from Love Field airport). The Dallas Court of Appeals relied on
the concept of legitimization to deny the injunction requested by nearby property
owners stating, "[iut is undisputed that the proposed runway will be a permanent
improvement constructed by a municipality for public use pursuant to legislative
authority. Therefore, it is not legally a nuisance." Id. at 278. More recent cases,
however, have suggested that only an injunction is unavailable, and that other
remedies might be available at law. See Schulman v. City of Houston, 406 S.W.2d
219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
-5 603 P.2d 1329 (Cal. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980).
-. Id. at 1330.
,.7 Id. at 1332.
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implication from the powers expressly conferred, so that it
can be fairly stated that the legislature contemplated the
doing of the very act which occasions the injury.15 8
The court declared its approval for the view that although
an activity authorized by statute cannot be a nuisance, the
way in which the activity is performed may create a nui-
sance.' 59 Accordingly, although state and federal legisla-
tion authorizes creation of airport authorities and
regulates airports and flights, these governmental acts
cannot create statutory immunity from nuisance claims.
60
As described previously, the preemption doctrine allo-
cates decisions on aircraft design and flight patterns to the
federal government.' 6' In the past, some courts have re-
lied on this doctrine to bar state common law nuisance
actions against governmental operated airports. 62  A
number of recent cases, however, have viewed preemp-
tion narrowly and allowed valid nuisance claims against
airport proprietors. 63 In Bieneman v. City of Chicago,'64 for
1.18 Id. (quoting Hassell v. San Francisco, 78 P.2d 1021, 1022-23 (Cal. 1938)).
9 Id. (quoting Venuto v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350,
359 (1971)).
- Greater Westchester, 603 P.2d at 1337 (Cal. 1979).
1 1 See supra notes 31-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the preemp-
tion doctrine.
162 See, e.g., Burbank, 411 U.S. at 624 (holding that a city ordinance was pre-
empted by the Federal Aviation Act and the Noise Control Act); Luedtke v. Mil-
waukee, 521 F.2d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 1975) (stating, in response to a nuisance
claim based on low-altitude flights, "[s]ince the federal laws and regulations have
preempted local control of aircraft flights ... the defendants may not, to the ex-
tent they comply with the federal laws and regulations, be charged with negli-
gence or creating a nuisance."); City of Irving v. FAA, 539 F. Supp. 17, 24 (N.D.
Tex. 1981) (denying injunction against testing of diagonal runway because "Con-
gress ... has preempted the regulation of aircraft noise, so that there can be no
state or local laws or nuisance suits concerning noise caused by airport
operations.").
-, Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 705 P.2d 866, 872 (Cal.
1985) ("Federal preemption of local regulation of airport noise is not abso-
lute.... [S]tate law damage remedies remain available against an airport proprie-
tor despite the fact that federal law precludes interference with commercial flight
patterns and schedules."); Greater Westchester, 603 P.2d at 1336 (recognizing the
state's traditional interest in compensating its citizens for damages and holding
that claims for personal injuries founded upon nuisance have not been federally
preempted).
-4 864 F.2d 463 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1080 (1988). In this long-
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example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit overruled its prior determination of preemp-
tion seen in Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee.165 The court
found that the Federal Aviation Act does not expressly
preempt state damages remedies; in fact, the act expressly
saves such remedies, providing that "nothing contained in
this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies
now existing at common law or by statute .... ,,166 Noting
that extensive federal regulation in the nuclear power in-
dustry had not precluded the use of common law reme-
dies in recent cases involving that industry, the court
applied the same logic to air transportation, and found
that federal law did not so extensively occupy the field as
to preclude common law action. 67 The Seventh Circuit
also acknowledged that numerous jurisdictions consider-
ing this issue since Luedtke had concluded that nuisance
and similar state law actions were not preempted by fed-
eral law. 168
The Bieneman court limited the use of these common
law remedies to those aspects of airport operation not
subject to federal control.' 69 These proprietor options,
however, are exactly the issues likely to be contested when
an airport undertakes new construction. Federal law does
fought case on behalf of northern Illinois residents affected by noise from O'Hare
airport, plaintiffs have been unsuccessful in their federal claims: requesting class
certification, alleging deprivation of property without due process, and seeking to
escape the statute of limitations. They have, however, received a favorable ruling
that certain common law claims are not preempted by federal law.
165 21 F.2d 387, 390-91 (7th Cir. 1974).
1- Bieneman,.864 F.2d at 471 (quoting Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1506 (1976)).
167 Id. at 472.
1- Id. at 470.
-9 Id. at 472-73. The court stated:
A state court could not award damages against O'Hare [Airport] or
its users for conduct required by these [federal] regulations, or for
not engaging in noise-abatement procedures that the Federal Avia-
tion Administration considered but rejected as unsafe .... There
may be, on the other hand, aspects of O'Hare's operations that of-
fend federal law, or that federal norms do not govern.
Id. The court uses as examples of the latter a lack of adequate perimeter noise
baffles or building more runways than required by federal law. Id.
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not require the addition of new runways; this is a choice
made by DFW and other airports seeking to maintain
their competitive position in the commercial aviation mar-
ket. 7 0 If this distinction between federally mandated ac-
tions and local options is persuasive to other courts,
preemption will not bar nuisance claims based on harm
caused by the decisions of local airport proprietors.
B. Private or Public Nuisance
Nuisance is a broad and complex doctrine, and one
seeking to use it in the airport noise context has to face a
series of decisions regarding the claim. One of the first
such choices is whether a claim will be based on public or
private nuisance. A public nuisance is one affecting a
large community of persons, and in order to succeed in
this sort of claim, an individual must show that he has suf-
fered some greater harm than others have experienced.' 7 '
In addition, the extent of the harm will be balanced
against the utility of the activity to the community.17 2
One facet of public nuisance that is especially attractive
to persons claiming harm from intrusive noise is its poten-
tial for use as a cause of action by persons who do not own
170 Bob Moos, Airport Expansion Inevitable, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 21,
1990, at A19.
1' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C, 821F (1977); see also KEETON et al,
supra note 149, at 646 (stating uniform rule that "a private individual has no ac-
tion for the invasion of the purely public right, unless his damage is in some way
to be distinguished from that sustained by other members of the general pub-
lic."); Institoris, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 424 (plaintiff suing on public nuisance basis must
show special injury in kind, not only in degree, from that experienced by the gen-
eral public).
172 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 829A states that compensation will be
made only for unreasonable interference in a property owner's interest. See, e.g.,
Smithdeal v. American Airlines, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 233, 234 (N.D. Tex. 1948) (bal-
ancing of equities of $ 10,000,000 city and private investment in Love Field against
individual alleging airport noise constituted nuisance); Greater Westchester, 603 P.2d
at 1330 (resolution of airport liability in noise nuisance action requires careful
weighing of public interest in commercial aviation against property owner's right
to peaceful enjoyment of his land.); see also Rossi, supra note 153, at 793 (courts
must consider possible financial burden on air commerce as well as need to pro-
tect landowners from airport noise damage).
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property in the airport vicinity. 173 Apartment dwellers or
tenants of commercial space may use public nuisance to
seek compensation for such harms as annoyance, incon-
venience, discomfort, and mental or emotional distress. 74
In addition, property owners who cannot show a decline
in the market value of their land but who nevertheless do
experience personal harm may also use public nuisance as
their cause of action. A further advantage of this cause of
action is that the defenses of prescription, laches, and ex-
piration of the statute of limitations do not run against
public nuisance. 75
In private nuisance, the relief sought must be based on
harm to property. 76 The party seeking a remedy for pri-
vate nuisance must demonstrate some interference with
the use and enjoyment of land. 77 In the airport context,
this interference may be due to noise, smoke, vibration, or
other effects of aviation. In order to rise to the level of a
nuisance, however, the alleged harm must be substantial
and unreasonable, and of such a nature that it would be
offensive or inconvenient to a normal person.' 7 The re-
quirement for a substantial interference can be met by
proof of a measurable decline in property value. 79 In the
absence of a sufficient showing of substantial harm, nui-
sance damages are likely to be denied. Thus, in Smithdeal
v. American Airlines, Inc.,1 0 the federal district court dis-
missed the plaintiff's claim because he failed to show that
aircraft flights in the vicinity of his home caused any harm
greater than occasional interruptions in conversations and
interference with radio reception. The court held that
such complaints were "suffered or enjoyed by all of the
people. They are the elements of progress.' 8 ' In gen-
173 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 82 1B.
,74 Greater Westchester, 603 P.2d at 329.
17.s KEETON et al, supra note 149, at 648.
176 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D.
177 KEETON et al, supra note 149, at 619.
" Id. at 620.
17 Id. at 623.
80 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Tex. 1948).
I" d. at 234.
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eral, this sort of minor noise disturbance is considered a
necessary fact of modern life, and is not considered suffi-
cient to justify the imposition of tort liability.182
C. Permanent or Continuing Nuisance
Characterization of the alleged nuisance as either per-
manent or continuing will affect both the damages which
may be awarded and the time within which an action may
be brought. If the nuisance is defined as permanent, dam-
ages may be awarded for all past, present and future
harm. 18 3 Typically, a permanent nuisance refers to a
building or other structure. 84 Possibly an airport runway
could be placed in this category, although it could also be
argued that it is the aircraft themselves, rather than the
airport or its facilities, that cause the alleged harm.
A continuing nuisance is an act which can be discontin-
ued. Damages are allowed only for the harm suffered un-
til the present. If the nuisance is not discontinued, a new
action must be brought to seek compensation for the ad-
ditional harm. Noise, vibration, and air pollution are usu-
ally considered to be continuing nuisances. 8 5
Because only one action is required to recover damages
for ongoing harm, the permanent nuisance action appears
more favorable to those alleging an airport noise nui-
sance. However, state statutes of limitation or prescrip-
tive rights statutes may alter this perception. In Institoris
v. City of Los Angeles,' 86 the court held that the airport had
acquired a prescriptive avigation easement over the sub-
ject property because flights had been operating in the vi-
182 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822, cmt. j.
", John M. Werlich and Richard P. Krinsky, Recent Developments in Aircraft Noise
Law, 18 URB. L. 863, 871 (1986).
184 Baker, 705 P.2d at 866, 870 (1985) ("[T]he distinction to be drawn is be-
tween encroachments of a permanent nature erected upon one's lands, and a
complaint made, not of the location of the offending structures, but of the contin-
uing use of such structures." (citing Tracy v. Ferrara, 301 P.2d. 904, 905 (1956)).
Baker, 705 P.2d. at 866.
'", 258 Cal. Rptr. at 418 (plaintiff, lessor of hotel near Los Angeles Interna-
tional Airport, unsuccessfully sought damages for inverse condemnation and nui-
sance based on aircraft noise).
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cinity for more than the number of years required to
establish a taking by prescription. The starting date for
this public acquisition also marked the start of the run-
ning of the statute of limitations. Thus, permanent nui-
sance claims were time-barred,187 while claims for
continuing nuisance could be brought as long as the al-
leged nuisance continued to operate. 8 8 The difficulty in
using continuous nuisance was that the state's govern-
mental tort claims act allowed recovery only for injury oc-
curring within one hundred days immediately prior to the
time of filing a claim. This statutory limit severely af-
fected the potential amount of recoverable damages and
also required filing for a new nuisance action for each one
hundred days of on-going harm. 189
Because the dividing line between permanent and con-
tinuous nuisances is often a cloudy one, courts generally
allow a plaintiff to make this election, choosing the claim
best suited to the individual's complaint. 90 One seeking
permanent nuisance damages must bring this action
within the applicable statute of limitations. This makes a
permanent nuisance claim especially appropriate when
new airport construction is the source of the alleged nui-
sance. In those instances where the noise problem has
been ongoing or where no decline in property value is al-
leged and the harm is personal in nature, continuous nui-
sance is the appropriate cause of action.
D. Nature of Remedy
Historically, those claiming to be harmed by a nuisance
sought to have the offending action enjoined.' 9' But
I7 d. at 422-23; see also Christie v. Miller, 719 P.2d 68 (Or. Ct. App. 1986)
(private airstrip acquired easement by prescription although planes did not con-
tinuously land or take off).
188 Institoris, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 423; see also Baker, 705 P.2d at 866: "[I]f a nui-
sance is a use which may be discontinued at any time, it is considered continuing
in character and persons harmed by it may bring successive actions for damages
until the nuisance is abated." Id.
-9 Institoris, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
- Werlich and Krinsky, supra note 183, at 870.
It. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D, cmt. a (1977).
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where the utility of the activity is high, as with an industry
employing many persons or highway needed to accommo-
date transportation demands, courts are reluctant to or-
der a cessation of such activities. This can sometimes be
the case even when the plaintiff can clearly demonstrate
substantial and unreasonable harm.192
In such instances, some courts have crossed the line
that distinguishes between permanent and continuous
nuisance, awarding permanent damages (past, present,
and future) for an on-going nuisance. 193 This approach is
particularly appropriate in airport noise cases. The utility
of the airport is obviously high, both for the safety and
convenience of the travelling public and the stimulus to
the local economy. Yet persons in the immediate airport
vicinity will inevitably experience noise levels much
higher than those heard in the community as a whole,
19 The classic case in this area is Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870
(N.Y. 1970), in which the court departed from the traditional New York rule that
injunctions must always issue against a continuous nuisance. Id. at 315-16. The
court was troubled by the extent of the disparity in economic consequences be-
tween the local economic benefit of the cement plant and the unquestionable but
relatively minor harm to the neighboring landowners. The court resolved its di-
lemma by giving the cement plant a choice: accept an injunction or pay perma-
nent damages to the plaintiffs, compensating them for past, present and future
harm. Id. at 875.
1,3 Baker, 705 P.2d at 874 (Justice Mosk, concurring and dissenting) (test for
classifying nuisances as either continuing or permanent is based on whether
abatement of the nuisance is a reasonable remedy); see also, Maloney v. Heftier
Realty Co., 316 So.2d 594, 595 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); City of Columbus v.
Myszka, 272 S.E.2d 302, 305 (Ga. 1980); Goldstein v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,
404 A.2d 1064, 1068-69 (Md. 1979); Sundell, 409 A.2d at 1320-21; Krueger v.
Mitchell, 332 N.W.2d 733, 740-41 (Wis. 1983). Justice Traynor summarized the
rationale for such decisions in Spaulding v. Cameron, 239 P.2d 625, 627-29 (Cal.
1952) (holding where defendant could prove corrective measures would prevent
further mudslides onto plaintiff's property, the award to plaintiff would be limited
to past damages, but if future slides were likely, plaintiff could collect for perma-
nent loss in property value). Justice Traynor stated:
Situations arose, however, where injunctive relief was not appropri-
ate or where successive actions were undesirable either to the plain-
tiff or defendant or both. Accordingly, it was recognized that some
types of nuisances should be considered permanent, and in such
cases recovery of past and anticipated future damages were allowed
in one action.
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placing on those close to the facility an unfair share of the
cost of growth for which some compensation is due.
In addition to courts' reluctance to impose injunctions
on airport activity because of the potentially severe eco-
nomic impact of such actions, an injunction would also
have to survive the charge that it interferes in areas re-
served to federal control. Some of the earliest cases to
define the federal role in noise abatement declared that
locally imposed curfews violated the federal preemption
of aircraft flight operations.1 9 4 Since injunctions limiting
aircraft operations to certain runways or times of day
would have an effect much like a curfew, similar judicial
treatment can be expected. Thus, damages rather than
injunctive relief are the more likely remedy in airport nui-
sance cases.
E. Defenses to Nuisance
A neighboring property owner or occupant bringing a
nuisance action against a publicly owned airport faces two
categories of opposition. The first group of defenses con-
sists of claims that the airport proprietor simply cannot be
sued for the harm caused by aircraft noise. Included in
this category are claims of federal preemption or airport
activities,1 95 governmental immunity for a state or munici-
pally chartered airport authority, and the related concept
of legitimized nuisance, sanctioned by legislative
authority.' 96
The second body of defenses available to airports are
those common to all private nuisance actions, whether the
offending activity is operated by a government, corporate,
or individual owner. These include the running of the
statute of limitations, laches, and acquisition of prescrip-
- Burbank, 411 U.S. at 628. "[T]he record shows that FAA has consistently
opposed curfews, unless managed by it, in the interest of its management of the
'navigable airspace'." Id.
19-1 See supra notes 160-169 and accompanying text for discussion of federal pre-
emption in airport nuisance cases.
'-1 See supra note 152-159 and accompanying text for discussion of sovereign
immunity and legitimization of nuisance.
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tive rights to the airways.' 97 The success or failure of
these defenses depends on specific state laws, on facts re-
lating to when the nuisance first came into being, and
whether it has changed significantly in its effects, possibly
creating a new nuisance. 9 8
An argument frequently made by airport supporters is
that those complaining of aircraft noise knew of the air-
port's location and operations prior to purchasing nearby
property, and this awareness should bar any action
against the airport. This concept, known as "coming to a
nuisance," may not be as complete a defense as it first ap-
pears. 99 In fact, the majority rule is that a plaintiff is not
barred from recovery of damages merely because the nui-
sance-generating activity preceded the plaintiff's invest-
ment.2 0 0 This rule is based on the theory that an airport
or other potential nuisance cannot limit the use or enjoy-
ment of a neighbor's property.20 ' As long as the land was
bought in good faith and not purchased for the purpose
of bringing a nuisance-based lawsuit, and no prescriptive
easement had been acquired, one property owner should
not have to endure negative effects of another's intrusive
use.
20 2
,'v Werlich and Krinsky, supra note 183, at 870. These defenses do not, how-
ever, run against a public nuisance. Id. See supra notes 170-174 and accompanying
text for explanation of public nuisance.
1'9 Aaron, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 176. In discussing the time when the plaintiff prop-
erty owners' cause of action arose the court noted that this is a difficult question in
aircraft for noise cases, stating:
There is, unfortunately, no simple litmus test for discovering in all
cases when an avigation easement is first taken by overflights. Some
annoyance must be borne without compensation. The point when
that state is passed depends on a particularized judgment evaluating
such factors as the frequency and level of flights; the type of planes;
the accompanying effects, such as noise or falling objects; the uses of
the property; the effect on values; the reasonable reactions of the
humans below; and the impact upon animals and vegetable life.
Id. (quoting Jensen v. United States, 305 F.2d 444, 447 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (internal
citations omitted)).
,-9. Werlich and Krinsky, supra note 183, at 871.
2 Id.
20, KEETON et al, supra note 149, at 635.
202 Id. In some instances, however, a plaintiff's voluntary choice of a place to
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VI. CONCLUSION
As the DFW Airport experience illustrates, airports and
urban development are naturally attracted to each other.
Even an airport initially located in a relatively undevel-
oped area will soon find itself surrounded by businesses
and residents attracted by proximity to a convenient travel
facility or to the jobs generated by the airport itself.20 3
Yet what appears initially to be a beneficial relationship
contains the seeds of eventual conflict. The more success-
ful the airport is at attracting growth, the greater the de-
mand for more flights, larger aircraft, and longer or
additional runways. These changes increase airport ca-
pacity, but also either increase the amount of noise gener-
ated or broaden the area exposed to aircraft noise.
Courts appear to be placing the airport proprietor
squarely in the middle of this conflict. Through such ac-
tions as abandoning the overflight requirement, 20 4 nar-
rowing the scope of federal preemption, 20 5 and awarding
damages for nuisances having high public utility but unac-
ceptably negative effects,20 6 courts have signaled that air-
port proprietors must pay for the environmental
consequences of airport expansion.
The mitigation program currently proposed by the
DFW Airport Board reflects this "effects" approach. The
program differentiates treatment of property owners
based on noise contours rather than direct overflights,
ties payments to actual market value decreases in prop-
erty, and includes payments for noise-reduction tech-
live may be balanced against the public interest in the nuisance-generating activ-
ity. Id.
203 See supra note 9 and accompanying text for discussion of the employment
and residential growth generated by DFW Airport.
•oSee Thornburg, 376 P.2d at 100; Martin, 391 P.2d at 540; Aaron, 115 Cal. Rptr.
at 162.
05 See supra notes 45-70 and accompanying text for discussion of cases rejecting
complete federal preemption of airport noise regulation.
"- See supra note 192 and accompanying text for explanation of cases awarding
damages where enjoining a nuisance would have a severe economic impact or is
impractical for other reasons.
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niques such as soundproofing of sensitive uses.20 7 As the
airport seeks public support and progresses through the
required governmental approval processes, the scope of
compensable effects may increase if litigation is to be
avoided. While the resulting cost of the airport's expan-
sion will be high, compensating those impacted by airport
growth appears to be the inevitable price of success.
207 Federal Aviation Administration, supra note 1, at 4-133, 4-146.
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